Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Sanhedrin 7:4. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Sanhedrin 7:4. Mostrar todas las entradas

11/19/2026

2 Corinthians 12:7: Was Paul of Tarsus Stoned for Homosexuality? The Case File That Luke Never Wished to Open

BS"D


A Noahide lawyer, that is, a non-Jew who keeps the sheva mitzvot bnei Noach (שבע מצוות בני נח), the seven commandments of the children of Noah, with a discipline that many of us would envy, read the Book of Acts as one reads a case file: without devotion and with a pencil, looking for the gap between what the witness tells and what the witness leaves unsaid. I am told that he works within the Trump administration. I shall not give his name, and I would ask that no one go looking for it.

He underlined two patterns. The first: wherever Paul arrives, someone wants to stone him. The second: the men who work at his side, one after another, end up leaving. Anyone who has litigated knows how two such threads are knotted together. From the indication one passes to the motive, and from the motive to an uncomfortable question: what did the people of Lystra know that Luke, 'the beloved physician' (Colossians 4:14), the erōmenos (ἐρώμενος), decided not to write? The lawyer's answer was this: Paul maintained clandestine homosexual relations. The Torah punishes the act between males with stoning; those who stone him know something; his collaborators withdraw in shame; and the apologist Luke, with the elegance of one who edits a hagiography, keeps silent.

The Warren Cup, c. 15 BC–AD 15, embossed, chased and engraved silver with traces of gilding, height 11 cm × maximum diameter 11 cm, British Museum, London, registration no. 1999,0426.1, https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/G_1999-0426-1.

I confess my first reaction: I smiled. The second was less comfortable. An argument is not refuted with a smile; it is refuted with the texts in hand, and if by chance it held up, I needed to know. So I did what the best adversary of myself would do: I granted the lawyer his case for a few pages and stayed to see how far it would go.

What the case file appears to show

I set out what Acts and the letters say in the order in which it happens, because order is the first witness.

I begin with the Paul who is not yet Paul. In Acts 7:58 a young man apparently called Sha'ul (שָׁאוּל) guards the cloaks of those who stone Stephen; the verb is ἐλιθοβόλουν, 'they were stoning him', and Luke adds that Sha'ul 'was consenting' to his death (8:1). Let us hold on to the detail: the first time Paul appears in the book is in the midst of a stoning, and he is on the side of the stones.

Then the roles are reversed. In Damascus the Jews 'take counsel' to do away with him (9:23, ἀνελεῖν) and let him down over the wall in a basket (9:25); Paul tells the same story in 2 Corinthians 11:32–33, with a detail that Luke omits: the man guarding the gates was the ethnarch of King Aretas. In Jerusalem the Hellenists 'were trying to kill him' (9:29). In Pisidian Antioch the Jews 'were filled with jealousy' (13:45, ζήλου) and, with the help of devout women and notables of the city, drive him out (13:50).

In Iconium the tension rises. The 'disobedient' Jews (14:2, οἱ ἀπειθήσαντες Ἰουδαῖοι) poison the minds of the Gentiles and, when the ὁρμή breaks out (the 'rush', the onslaught of the crowd), the declared purpose is 'to maltreat and to stone them' (14:5, ὑβρίσαι καὶ λιθοβολῆσαι). Two details that are often lost. The verb is λιθοβολέω, the one the Septuagint uses for legal stoning (Vayikra 24:16, for example); and those who press forward are 'both Gentiles and Jews, with their rulers'. Paul and Barnabas learn of it and flee to Lystra. (Some texts in circulation on the subject cite Acts 14:2 and 14:10 as if there were a frustrated stoning there; there is not: the plot is in 14:5, and 14:10 is the healing of the cripple of Lystra.)

And in Lystra occurs the one thing that is attested by two independent sources. After the healing of the cripple, and after the episode in which the Lycaonians take Barnabas for Zeus and Paul for Hermes (14:11–18), there arrive 'Jews from Antioch and Iconium', who 'persuade the crowds' (14:19, πείσαντες τοὺς ὄχλους), stone Paul (λιθάσαντες τὸν Παῦλον) and drag him out of the city, supposing him dead. Paul confirms it from another pen and another decade: ἅπαξ ἐλιθάσθην, 'once I was stoned' (2 Corinthians 11:25). One plot and one stoning, not three stonings: that is the honest count. And note the change of verb, from the technical λιθοβολέω to the plainer λιθάζω, which is what a mob does.

A philological note, because the stone has a genealogy. The Syriac Peshitta uses, for the stoning at Lystra and that of 2 Corinthians, the root r-g-m (ܪܓܡ); it is the same as the Hebrew ragam (רגם), as in רָגוֹם יִרְגְּמוּ־בוֹ כָּל־הָעֵדָה, 'the whole congregation shall surely stone him' (Vayikra 24:16), and as the Arabic rajm (رجم). Targum Onkelos uses it even to render the Hebrew sakal (סקל), as in Shemot 19:13. In the Semitic languages, 'to stone' is a single word with many accents.

The list goes on. Thessalonica (17:5–9), where some jealous Jews gather 'certain wicked men of the marketplace' (ἀγοραίων τινὰς ἄνδρας πονηρούς) and denounce him before the politarchs for proclaiming 'another king, Yeshu' (17:7). Berea, to which the Thessalonians come to stir up trouble (17:13). Corinth, where they bring him before the proconsul Gallio (18:12). The plot as he is about to sail for Syria (20:3). The uproar in the Temple (21:27–31), where they were 'seeking to kill him' (ζητούντων τε αὐτὸν ἀποκτεῖναι). The oath of more than forty men neither to eat nor to drink until they had eliminated him (23:12–13). The ambush planned on the road to Caesarea (25:3).

I recount it in a single run so that one may see what the lawyer saw: some twenty years, more than a dozen episodes in which someone wanted to kill one man. And then the second column: Mark leaves him halfway (13:13); Barnabas, his guarantor before Jerusalem, separates from him (Galatians 2:13; Acts 15:36–40); Demas abandons him (2 Timothy 4:10); Phygelus and Hermogenes, together with 'all those in Asia', turn away (2 Timothy 1:15). Read in a single run, I admit, it has the look of a case.

The plea, in its best version

What follows is not my opinion. It is the lawyer's plea, reconstructed as I would have written it if my profession were to win and not to understand. I write it in his voice because a hypothesis is refuted well only when it has been left in its best form. He started from two patterns; the rest I add myself, with material that he would have approved:

I shall not present an eyewitness, because there is none and there cannot be, and whoever demands one has misunderstood what an indication is. Acts of the bedchamber leave no witnesses; they leave lateral traces. That is why there exist, from the ius commune to the common law, circumstantial evidence and the principle of res ipsa loquitur: the law learnt centuries ago that the most intimate offences are those best concealed, and that if one convicted only on the testimony of eyewitnesses one would acquit half of history. No one will ask me for direct proof. I shall be asked, with justice, that my indications converge. I shall show that they converge.

First, the pattern. One incident is an accident; a dozen, in different cities, over twenty years and at the hands of groups that did not know one another, is a regularity, and regularities call for a cause. Now, doctrines do not raise stones. A dispute over the telos of the Torah mobilises synagogues, lawsuits and floggings (five, according to Paul himself); what mobilises a crowd, as any historian of lynchings knows, is the perception of a concrete, proximate and visible moral contamination. Acts 14:19 says in so many words that it was not the learned but 'the crowds', persuaded. Persuaded of what? Luke does not say. And the penalty coincides with that which the Mishnah assigns to ha-ba al ha-zakhar (הבא על הזכור), the one who has intercourse with a male (Sanhedrin 7:4). It will be objected that stoning punishes other things. I know it, and I do not need it to be the only explanation: it is enough for me that it be compatible and that it be, among the compatible ones, the one that best fits with the rest.

Alongside the pattern of the stones, that of the desertions, which is the finest finding of this case file. Mark abandons him; Barnabas, his guarantor, separates from him; Demas leaves him. Each rupture has its explanation in the text, I concede. But compare what Paul does with each: Peter he rebukes to his face and tells of it (Galatians 2:11–14); Barnabas he mentions, without reproach, as swept along by the hypocrisy of others (2:13), and never says another word about him. When a relationship ends without judgements, without personal reproaches and without a full explanation from either side, the litigator thinks of pacts of silence.

Second, the selective witness. Luke is our only chronicler of those years, and a chronicler is a lawyer who charges no fee. Luke omits the collection, to which Paul devotes entire chapters of his letters (1 Corinthians 16; 2 Corinthians 8–9; Romans 15:25–32); he omits the clash at Antioch, which Paul recounts as a victory; he omits every letter; and he closes his book with Paul alive and under house arrest (28:30–31), without telling how he ended. This is what Anglo-American jurists call habit evidence: the admission, to prove how someone acted in analogous circumstances, of his custom. Luke edits Paul, and edits him systematically wherever the material is uncomfortable. Note, moreover, his technique: he keeps the minor accusations, which are defensible (that he teaches against the law (18:13), against the people and the place (21:28), that he is the ringleader of a sect (24:5)), and he keeps silent about the one that would not be. It is the oldest technique of the cover-up: leave the defensible charge in view so that no one looks for the other.

Third, the involuntary confession. Few men speak of themselves with such violence. 'I strike my body and enslave it' (1 Corinthians 9:27, ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ, where the verb means, literally, 'to give a black eye'). 'There was given to me a splinter in the flesh, an angel of Satan to buffet me' (2 Corinthians 12:7, σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί). 'I do not do what I want but what I hate' and 'wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?' (Romans 7:15, 24), and at the centre of that struggle, ἐπιθυμία, desire (7:7–8). I do not say what the desire is; I say that the structure of the confession is exactly that of one who lives a permanent discordance between what he desires and the norm that he himself preaches, and that this norm he wrote with his own pen in Romans 1:26–27. A man who condemns with such vigour what lies closest to what he confesses resembles a defendant more than a legislator.

Fourth, the disposition. Here I need invent nothing, because he wrote it himself. He advises celibacy as the preferable state (1 Corinthians 7:1, 7–8, 26–27). His view of women is a system: the head of the woman is the man (11:3); only the man is 'the image and glory of God', the woman is 'the glory of man' and was created 'for the sake of the man' (11:7–9); women are to keep silent in the assemblies (14:34–35); wives are to submit to their husbands 'in everything' (Ephesians 5:24, whose Pauline authorship is disputed, although the system coincides with that of the undisputed letters). On his journeys he is not known to have a wife, when other apostles travel with 'a sister as wife' (9:5); and the most intense terms of affection in his letters are addressed to men: 'my beloved and faithful child' (1 Corinthians 4:17), 'my fellow soldier' (συστρατιώτης: Philippians 2:25; Philemon 2), the disciple whose tears he remembers (2 Timothy 1:4). And there is more: he thinks of himself as a nurse who cherishes her children (1 Thessalonians 2:7) and as a woman in labour (Galatians 4:19, ὠδίνω). None of these data proves anything by itself. But a court does not ask what each indication proves; it asks what explains the whole.

Fifth, the decoy. A century after the events, a presbyter devoted to Paul writes a novel in which a sexual scandal surrounds the apostle in Iconium, just where Acts 14:5 places the plot to stone him. The novel says that he was accused of taking wives from their husbands, and that he, faced with the woman who adores him, keeps her at a distance, defers her baptism and even denies that he knows her. The most effective hagiographical cover-ups do not deny the scandal: they replace it with another of lesser social penalty. If one must explain why the people of Iconium wanted to stone him, nothing is more economical than to offer an ascetic version of the scandal, which is respectable, in place of the other.

I close as good pleas close: without accusing, by asking. The stones, the men who leave, the chastised flesh, the women kept at a distance, the chronicler's silence and the novel that replaces one story with another are six facts of different natures, and a single explanation unites them. Might it not be, quite simply, because it is the explanation?

I confess that the first time I wrote it out in this way I fell silent for a while. It is a good plea: it has architecture, it has cadence, and each piece rests on a text that can be opened and verified. It has, like all good pleas, a defect that is not discovered by reading it but by auditing it: it proves too much. Before auditing it I wish to do something that pleas do not do, which is to separate what within it is hypothesis from what is datum. For one part withstands any audit.

The aside: Paul as 'misogynist'. Is it proof of his alleged homosexuality?

There is one piece of the plea that is not hypothesis, and I treat it with the rigour it deserves, because it is the only one in which the lawyer is right without qualification: the texts on women exist, they are early, and they do not dissolve with good exegetical will. I verify them in order, with what the oldest manuscripts allow us to affirm and with what they do not.

1 Corinthians 11:3. θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι ὅτι παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός ('But I want you to know that the head of every man is the Christos, and the head of a woman is the man, and the head of the Christos is God.'). The three-link chain reads the same in P46 (c. AD 200), in Vaticanus and in Sinaiticus; no variant touches the noun κεφαλή, 'head'. The philological debate over its sense (is it 'source, origin' or 'authority'?) is real and I need not resolve it, because the verses that follow make it unnecessary.

1 Corinthians 11:7–9. ἀνὴρ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀφείλει κατακαλύπτεσθαι τὴν κεφαλήν, εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων· ἡ δὲ γυνὴ δόξα ἀνδρός ἐστιν… οὐκ ἐκτίσθη ἀνὴρ διὰ τὴν γυναῖκα, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα ('For a man ought not to cover his head, being the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of man… for man was not created on account of the woman, but woman on account of the man.'). The asymmetry is explicit: 'image and glory of God' is predicated of the man alone, while the woman is δόξα ἀνδρός, doxa andros, and the preposition ἐκ ('from, out of') and the formula διά with the accusative ('on account of') build a creational genealogy. Here, to a reader of Hebrew, something else leaps to the eye: Paul reads Genesis 2 against Genesis 1. Bereshit 1:27 says: ויברא אלהים את האדם בצלמו בצלם אלהים ברא אתו זכר ונקבה ברא אתם ('And God created the human being in his image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them'): the image of God is predicated of ha-adam, and zakhar u-nekevah, 'male and female', are together the object of creation. The Septuagint preserves it (κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς: 'in the image of God he made him, male and female he made them'), and rabbinic exegesis went so far as to read the verse as the creation of a double Adam, male and female at once (Midrash Bereshit Rabbah 8:1; Bavli, Eruvin 18a), precisely so as not to leave woman outside the image. Paul does the opposite: he reserves the εἰκών for the man and confines the woman to the rib. And the ezer kenegdo (עזר כנגדו, Bereshit 2:18), the 'help opposite him' (ezer is the title that the Torah applies to HaShem himself (Devarim 33:29; Tehillim 33:20)), Paul renders with a διά: 'on account of the man'. The Talmud, by contrast, dwells on the ambivalence of kenegdo: 'if he merits, a help; if not, against him' (Bavli, Yevamot 63a).

1 Corinthians 11:10. διὰ τοῦτο ὀφείλει ἡ γυνὴ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ('For this reason the woman ought to have authority on her head, on account of the angels.'). The gloss 'sign of' that many versions supply is an interpretation; the Greek says 'authority'. Whose authority it is is a real debate, and the 'on account of the angels' remains an enigma. What is verifiable is the scheme: an asymmetrical cultic order (the man uncovered, the woman covered) founded upon an order of creation (11:8–9) and upon a chain of heads (11:3).

1 Corinthians 14:34–35. αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις σιγάτωσαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει. εἰ δὲ τι μαθεῖν θέλουσιν, ἐν οἴκῳ τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν· αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναιξὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ('Let the women keep silent in the assemblies, for it is not permitted to them to speak, but let them be subordinate, as the law also says (?). And if they wish to learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home, for it is shameful for women to speak in assembly.'). P46 (damaged), Sinaiticus and Vaticanus have it in its place, after verse 33; a Western group, with D, F and G, moves it to after verse 40, and from this arises the suspicion that it is a later insertion. It is a variant of position, not of absence: some read it as a gloss (Fee; Payne, with his interpretation of the distigmai of Vaticanus), but the hypothesis is disputed and no manuscript omits the passage. I prefer not to wager on it: an argument for interpolation without a single witness that omits the passage is an exegetical wish, not a datum.

It is rightly pointed out that σιγάω also appears in 14:28 and 14:30, for the one who speaks in tongues and for the prophet, and that ὑποτάσσω is used in 14:32 for the spirits of the prophets: they are verbs of cultic order. But what 14:34 adds to the cultic order is the reason: 'as the law also says' and 'it is shameful' (αἰσχρόν). A reason of turn-taking is resolved by an order of speaking; a reason of shame is a reason of status. Which law? The Torah contains no verse that commands woman to be silent in the assembly. The nearest echo is Bereshit 3:16, והוא ימשל בך, 'and he shall rule over you', where HaShem describes a consequence and does not promulgate a mitzvah. What the Torah narrates, on the contrary, is the opposite: the daughters of Tzelofchad present themselves before Moshe, before Elazar, before the princes and before kol ha-edah, the whole congregation, and they speak (Bamidbar 27:2); and the divine verdict is כן בנות צלפחד דברת, 'the daughters of Tzelofchad speak rightly' (27:7). Miriam leads the song of the women (Shemot 15:20–21), Devorah judges Israel (Shoftim 4:4), Hulda prophesies to the king (2 Melakhim 22:14–20). I do not claim that rabbinic Judaism is an egalitarian paradise: the Talmud excludes woman from the public reading of the Torah mipnei kevod ha-tzibbur, 'because of the dignity of the congregation' (Bavli, Megillah 23a). But note the difference of lexicon, kavod as against αἰσχρόν (dignity as against shame), and of method: the Talmud does not invent a verse that does not exist.

Ephesians 5:22–24. The short reading of P46 and B lacks the verb (αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ, 'Wives, to their own husbands, as to the Lord'), and the instruction is inherited from the participle ὑποτασσόμενοι of verse 21; Sinaiticus and other witnesses make explicit ὑποτασσέσθωσαν. The datum is useful but does not change the substance: verse 24, in all three, closes with ἐν παντί, 'in everything'. I must note that the authorship of Ephesians, like that of Colossians (3:18) and of 1 Timothy (2:11–12, where the woman is to learn 'in silence' and is not permitted to teach), is disputed among specialists; for that reason the plea, and I with it, rests the weight on 1 Corinthians, which no one disputes.

Galatians 3:28 ('there is neither male nor female') and Romans 16 (Phoebe, deacon; Junia, 'notable among the apostles') will be invoked. It is not for me to decide which of the Pauls is the true one; it is for me to note that the same corpus contains both things, that a baptismal formula on status in Yeshu does not repeal rules of assembly written by the same hand, and that 11:5, where women pray and prophesy, coexists without explanation with 14:34. The tension is theirs and their pseudo-apostle's.

The verifiable balance is this: rules of silence, subjection and symbolic subordination, early, well attested and sustained by an exegesis of Genesis that coincides neither with the Torah nor with its first readers. The adjective 'misogynist' is a modern moral valuation and I leave it to the reader; the datum is not a hypothesis. And now, the lawyer. For what is not a hypothesis either is the leap that comes next.

A method is tested on another suspect

Now the inference. And I begin as prudent judges begin: by testing the method on another defendant. If 'they wanted to stone him' plus 'his collaborators left' amounts to an indication of a hidden life, let us apply it to another man.

Moshe Rabbenu, in the wilderness, cries out to HaShem: עוד מעט וסקלני, 'a little more and they will stone me' (Shemot 17:4). Of Yehoshua and Kalev, for contradicting the report of the spies, 'all the congregation said to stone them' (Bamidbar 14:10: ויאמרו כל העדה לרגום אותם באבנים, 'and all the congregation said to stone them with stones'). Of David, at Tziklag, 'the people spoke of stoning him' (1 Shemuel 30:6: ויאמרו העם לסקלו). As for collaborators who leave: his father-in-law Yitro, the best administrative consultant he ever had, takes his leave and returns to his own land (Shemot 18:27); Aharon and Miriam speak against him (Bamidbar 12:1); Korach gathers two hundred and fifty notables (Bamidbar 16:2). A lawyer with the desire could assemble from this a thicker file than Paul's. No one has opened it, and that should disquiet us more than reassure us, because it means that we all know, without saying so, that 'they wanted to stone him' proves nothing except that people are enraged by whoever says what they do not wish to hear.

The New Testament itself lends material for the exercise. Hebrews 11:37 counts among the faithful those who ἐλιθάσθησαν, 'were stoned'. John 10:31–33 says that they raised stones against Yeshu 'for blasphemy' (περὶ βλασφημίας). Mark 14:50 affirms that, when he was seized, 'all, forsaking him, fled'. Stones raised and companions who leave: the same profile. No one maintains what that profile would suggest, nor do I, and that is precisely why the example serves: all it demonstrates is that the profile demonstrates nothing.

The search: what the Mishnah actually says

There remained the pillar of the hypothesis: that stoning is the penalty proper to the homosexual relation. It is the idea that circulates, with a still stronger variant: that the Mishnah mentions stoning 'only once' and in connection with that offence, in the tractate Yevamot. I went to the sources in the frame of mind of one who expects them to vindicate the lawyer.

Sanhedrin 7:4 opens with a sentence that leaves no room for doubt, אלו הן הנסקלין, 'these are those who are stoned'. And what follows is a list, not an exclusivity: he who has intercourse with his mother, with his father's wife, with his daughter-in-law; הבא על הזכור, 'he who has intercourse with a male' (here is the offence the lawyer was looking for), but also he who has intercourse with a beast; the המגדף, the blasphemer; the עובד עבודה זרה, the idolater; he who gives of his seed to Molech; the necromancer; the המחלל את השבת, he who profanes the Sabbath; he who curses his father or his mother; he who has intercourse with a betrothed girl; the המסית, the one who incites, and the המדיח, the one who leads astray; the sorcerer; the rebellious son:

אֵלּוּ הֵן הַנִּסְקָלִין, הַבָּא עַל הָאֵם, וְעַל אֵשֶׁת הָאָב, וְעַל הַכַּלָּה, וְעַל הַזְּכוּר, וְעַל הַבְּהֵמָה, וְהָאִשָּׁה הַמְבִיאָה אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, וְהַמְגַדֵּף, וְהָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַנּוֹתֵן מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמֹּלֶךְ, וּבַעַל אוֹב וְיִדְּעוֹנִי, וְהַמְחַלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, וְהַמְקַלֵּל אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, וְהַבָּא עַל נַעֲרָה הַמְאֹרָסָה, וְהַמֵּסִית, וְהַמַּדִּיחַ, וְהַמְכַשֵּׁף, וּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה. הַבָּא עַל הָאֵם, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵם וּמִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם הָאֵם בִּלְבָד. הַבָּא עַל אֵשֶׁת אָב חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אָב וּמִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, בֵּין בְּחַיֵּי אָבִיו בֵּין לְאַחַר מִיתַת אָבִיו, בֵּין מִן הָאֵרוּסִין בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין. הַבָּא עַל כַּלָּתוֹ, חַיָּב עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם כַּלָּתוֹ וּמִשּׁוּם אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, בֵּין בְּחַיֵּי בְנוֹ בֵּין לְאַחַר מִיתַת בְּנוֹ, בֵּין מִן הָאֵרוּסִין בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין. הַבָּא עַל הַזְּכוּר וְעַל הַבְּהֵמָה, וְהָאִשָּׁה הַמְבִיאָה אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, אִם אָדָם חָטָא, בְּהֵמָה מֶה חָטָאת, אֶלָּא לְפִי שֶׁבָּאת לָאָדָם תַּקָּלָה עַל יָדָהּ, לְפִיכָךְ אָמַר הַכָּתוּב תִּסָּקֵל. דָּבָר אַחֵר, שֶׁלֹּא תְהֵא בְּהֵמָה עוֹבֶרֶת בַּשּׁוּק וְיֹאמְרוּ זוֹ הִיא שֶׁנִּסְקַל פְּלוֹנִי עַל יָדָהּ:

Academic translation of Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:4, with clarifications in brackets based on the Mishnat Eretz Israel:

'These are those who are stoned [executed by stoning, one of the four forms of capital punishment of the court] (cf. the parallel lists in Sanhedrin 9 and 11, and in Makkot 2 and 3; a related list in Keritot 1:1): he who lies with his mother [called in the Torah "the father's wife"; the Mishnah distinguishes the two cases] (cf. Lev 18:8; 20:11); he who lies with his father's wife [who is not his mother] (Lev 18:8; 20:11); he who lies with his daughter-in-law (Lev 18:15; 20:12); he who lies with a male (Lev 18:22; 20:13); he who lies with an animal (Lev 18:23; 20:15); the woman who brings an animal to herself [so that it lies with her] (Lev 18:23; 20:16; thus far the list coincides with Keritot 1:1); the blasphemer [megaddef, one who expressly pronounces the divine Name; the biblical passage refers, strictly, to one who transgresses one of the commandments of the Eternal] (Sanhedrin 7:5; Num 15:30); he who serves idolatry [avodah zarah, "foreign service"; with no direct biblical source for this penalty]; he who gives of his seed to Molech [a deity to whom children were given by being passed through fire] (Lev 18:21; 20:2–5; Sanhedrin 7:7); the ba'al ov [he who raises the dead from Sheol] and the yidde'oni [diviner; it is not clear why his penalty is stoning] (Lev 20:27; 1 Sam 28; Sanhedrin 7:7); he who profanes the Sabbath [one who deliberately performs a prohibited labour; other sources dispute whether his penalty is death or divine excision, karet] (Exod 31:14; cf. Megillah 1:5; Sanhedrin 7:8); he who curses his father and his mother (Exod 21:17; Lev 20:9; the definition of "cursing" is in Sanhedrin 7:8); he who lies with a betrothed girl [na'arah me'orasah, betrothed but not yet fully married] (Deut 22:23–24; Sanhedrin 7:9); the mesit [one who incites to idolatry; according to the Mishnah, an ordinary man who privately incites another individual] (Deut 13:7–12; Sanhedrin 7:10); the madiah [one who leads astray to idolatry, speaking in the plural: "let us go and serve…"; the Babylonian Talmud refers it to one who leads astray the inhabitants of a city] (Deut 13:14–19; Sanhedrin 7:10; Bavli, Sanhedrin 67a); the sorcerer [mekhashef] (Exod 22:17; Sanhedrin 7:11); and the stubborn and rebellious son [ben sorer umoreh] (Deut 21:18–21; its definition is developed in Sanhedrin 8).'

The claim that the Mishnah mentions stoning 'exclusively once' is false on its face: chapters 6 and 7 of Sanhedrin are built upon it. Those who refer to Yevamot 8:6, the discussion of the androginos, cite a marginal case, not the rule.

And the stoning of the Mishnah is not what a crowd does. It requires a court of twenty-three (Sanhedrin 1:4), two witnesses (Devarim 17:6), prior warning (the hatra'ah, התראה, from the root ת-ר-ע, 'to sound the alarm'; Bavli, Sanhedrin 40b–41a) and that the witnesses cast the first stone (Devarim 17:7). But above all it requires that the court be able to pass sentence of death, and on this the tradition is unanimous: forty years before the destruction of the Temple, Israel lost jurisdiction in capital cases (Bavli, Sanhedrin 41a; Bavli, Avodah Zarah 8b; Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 1:1, 18a). The New Testament agrees, with a sentence that no Jew of the first century would have had any interest in inventing: 'it is not lawful for us to put anyone to death' (John 18:31, ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀποκτεῖναι οὐδένα). The stoning at Lystra was not a sentence. It was a lynching, and Luke says so with his verb: 'they persuaded the crowds'.

When someone tried to give the appearance of a sentence to a stoning, around the year 62, the result was a scandal. The high priest Ananus (Hanan ben Sethi) convened a court without waiting for the procurator and had Ya'akov bar Pandira stoned, whom Josephus presents as 'the brother of Yeshu, called Christ' (I quote his spelling, and return to Yeshu); the citizens most scrupulous about the laws protested to Agrippa and to Albinus, and Ananus was deposed (Flavius Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 20.9.1, §200):

καθίζει συνέδριον κριτῶν καὶ παραγαγὼν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτῷ, καί τινας ἑτέρους, ὡς παρανομησάντων κατηγορίαν ποιησάμενος παρέδωκε λευσθησομένους

('He convened a sanhedrin of judges and, having brought before it the brother of Iesous who was called Christos, Iakobos by name, and certain others, having made an accusation against them as lawbreakers (παρανομησάντων), he delivered them up to be stoned.')

The detail matters twice over. First, because the reason Josephus gives for the stoning is that Ya'akov bar Pandira and his companions had 'transgressed the Torah' (παρανομησάντων): he is stoned as an offender, not as a sodomite. Second, because even then, in Jerusalem and with a court, the most rigorous observants considered it illegal.

With Stephen it is the same: they accuse him of speaking 'against this holy place and the Torah' (Acts 6:13, κατὰ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ τοῦ νόμου), a charge of apostasy, and his stoning (7:58) is that of a mob that does not wait for a verdict. Three men of the same movement stoned in three decades (Stephen, Paul, Ya'akov), and in no case is the alleged offence sexual.

There remains the coldest testimony of all, that of the one official without a party. When in Corinth the Jews bring Paul before the proconsul Gallio, whose term of office is fixed at about 51–52 by an inscription from Delphi, the accusation is that he 'persuades men to worship God contrary to the law' (Acts 18:13, παρὰ τὸν νόμον). Gallio dismisses him with a juridical shrug: they are 'questions about a word, and names, and your own law' (18:15, ζητήματά ἐστιν περὶ λόγου καὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ νόμου τοῦ καθ’ ὑμᾶς). A Roman who had no reason to help us classifies the suit as what it is: an intra-Jewish doctrinal dispute.

Where the plea breaks

We have already seen two things: that the method proves too much when applied to Moshe or to David, and that its normative premise is false in the Mishnah. What remains is the overall audit. A plea by converging indications is a legitimate instrument, and its defects lie not in its rhetoric but in four questions that any competent opposing counsel puts: whether the indications are independent; whether each is more probable under the hypothesis than under its rivals; whether the hypothesis can fail; and whether the normative system invoked admits that standard of proof. The lawyer's fails on all four.

First, independence. The six 'facts' of the plea are fewer than six. The stones and the collaborators who leave are, in large part, a single fact told twice: the halakhic quarrel over the Torah and the Gentiles, which Paul himself documents in Galatians 2:11–14 as the reason for his rupture with Barnabas and which Acts 21:20–21 identifies as the accusation that pursues him. The mobs and the former associates are not two witnesses of two hypotheses; they are two effects of a single conflict. To count them separately is the old vice of counting the same coin twice.

Second, comparative likelihood. An indication weighs to the extent that it is more probable under one hypothesis than under its rivals; if it is equally probable under both, its weight is nil however dramatic it may sound. I assess the indications one by one.

The stones. Under the doctrinal hypothesis exactly these are to be expected, and these occurred: three men of the same movement stoned in three decades (Stephen, Paul, Ya'akov ban Pandira), with an explicit doctrinal charge in each life (Acts 6:13; 18:13; 21:21; 21:28; Josephus, Antiquities 20.200, παρανομησάντων). Under the sexual hypothesis one would have to suppose that all three fell, by coincidence, into the same offence. The collaborators. The motive is written (Galatians 2:12–13; Acts 15:39), and the other deserters of 2 Timothy have their reason in plain view: Demas 'loved this present world' (4:10), not a bedchamber. And the list of those who did not leave is so long that the hypothesis would have to explain them too: Timothy, Titus, Silas, Luke, Aquila and Priscilla, who 'laid down their necks' for him (Romans 16:3–4). To choose those who leave and to be silent about those who stay is the textbook selection bias.

And, lastly, what happened after Lystra, which is the only item in the case file verifiable within the space of a few days. A man stoned in public for a sexual scandal does not find, immediately afterwards, the community 'gathering round him' (14:20, κυκλωσάντων… τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτόν); he does not return in 14:21 to Lystra, Iconium and Antioch 'strengthening' disciples; and he does not set out, years later, from that same place with his most faithful collaborator, of whom 'the brothers at Lystra and Iconium spoke well' (16:1–2). The hypothesis predicts badly at the one point where it can be put to the test.

Third, the disposition. The plea here rests its gravest weight, and its weakest link. The androcentrism that we verified in the aside is a doctrine about authority; orientation is a fact about desire. To infer the second from the first is a leap of category. And as an indication it is useless by ubiquity: Aristotle rules that the relation of the male to the female is, by nature, that of the superior to the inferior (Politics 1254b); Ben Sira blames woman for the origin of sin (25:24); Josephus, who writes about his people for Roman readers, asserts that according to the Torah woman is inferior to man in everything (Against Apion 2.201), attributing to the law what the law does not say, as Paul does in 14:34. A variable present in nearly all cultivated men of antiquity discriminates against none. I do not say this to excuse Paul: that his patriarchy be common does not absolve him of patriarchy. I say it because, as an indication of orientation, its likelihood ratio is simply 1. Worse for the plea: the systematic suspicion of woman is, in the wisdom literature (Proverbs 5–7; Ben Sira 9:8), a technique of men for managing desire towards women. The same datum admits both readings, and a datum that admits both readings does not decide between them.

Celibacy is much the same. Paul gives the reason himself: the ἀνάγκη, 'the present necessity' (7:26), because 'the time has been shortened' (7:29, ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος) and 'the form of this world is passing away' (7:31). It is eschatology, not a closed room. Second Temple Judaism knew celibates by conviction (the Essenes described by Josephus (Jewish War 2.120–121)) and the rabbinic tradition remembers Ben Azzai, who did not marry because נפשי חשקה בתורה, 'my soul longs for the Torah' (Bavli, Yevamot 63b), whom the sages reproached: he preaches well but practises ill (נאה דורש ואינו נאה מקיים). No one suspected Ben Azzai. What there is in Paul's counsel is a real halakhic fault: contradicting peru urevu (פרו ורבו, Bereshit 1:28), the first mitzvah, which the Talmud equates with the shedding of blood (Yevamot 63b). That is a documentable accusation. The other is not.

The 'tenderness' that the plea reads between the lines is the vocabulary of philosophical friendship and of rhetorical militia: συστρατιώτης, συνεργός, τέκνον are categories of ancient paideia, not a code. And the maternal self-image (the nurse of 1 Thessalonians 2:7, the woman in labour of Galatians 4:19) has precedents among the popular moralists, whom Abraham Malherbe documented, and in the Torah itself: Moshe asks whether he is to carry the people in his bosom 'as the omen (האמן) carries the suckling child' (Bamidbar 11:12), and Yeshayahu 49:23 calls the future kings omenim, 'nurses' of Israel, in a masculine form that Hebrew has and Spanish does not. If the device were an index of orientation, the leaders of the wilderness would have to answer too. I add a detail of textual criticism which will not be superfluous to a reader of this level: in 1 Thessalonians 2:7 the manuscript tradition wavers between νήπιοι, 'infants', and ἤπιοι, 'gentle', over a single nu. A metaphor that depends on one misplaced letter makes a poor foundation.

Fourth, the 'confession'. It is not the confession of a sexual desire. In Romans 7:7 the text that Paul cites to speak of desire is the tenth commandment, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (Shemot 20:14, לא תחמד), the only one in the Decalogue whose object is not an act but a disposition, and the example he gives has no sexual object. The 'I' of 7:7–25 is, for a good part of contemporary criticism, a rhetorical I, the figure that the Greeks called προσωποποιία, speaking in character; and since Krister Stendahl (1963) it has been known that the introspective reading that sees there the anguish of an individual conscience is a projection of Augustine and of Luther, not of Paul. In 1 Corinthians 9:27 the body that is struck lies within an explicit athletic metaphor (9:24–26: ἀγών, στάδιον, πυκτεύω): it is the body of the boxer. The 'splinter in the flesh' of 2 Corinthians 12:7 generated nineteen centuries of conjecture (illness, headaches, ophthalmia, adversaries, temptation of the flesh in the Latin tradition), and none was homosexual until it was proposed, in 1991, by an Anglican bishop, John Shelby Spong, in Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism. The word that Paul uses is not 'thorn' in the strict botanical sense, but σκόλοψ (skolops), a term that in Greek originally designates a stake, a pointed pole or an instrument of torture (hence derivatives such as σκολόψ and the family of words connected with the piercing), and only by metaphorical extension comes to mean that which pricks, torments or mortifies. The full expression, σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί (skolops tē sarki), 'splinter in the flesh', is thus understood not as a precise anatomical allusion but as a metaphor of persistent affliction, in the line of other biblical Greek usages where σκόλοψ renders the idea of a 'goad' or 'thorn' that mortifies: Numbers 33:55 and Joshua 23:13 speak of 'goads in your sides' (LXX: σκόλοψ), and Ezekiel 28:24 uses the same image of a bramble that pricks. In the Pauline context, the σκόλοψ is moreover qualified as ἄγγελος τοῦ σατανᾶ ('angel of Satan'), which directs the reading towards an affliction of adversarial origin (persecution, illness, temptation, missionary opposition) rather than towards a sexual category. Spong's interpretation, therefore, rests neither on the literal sense of σκόλοψ nor on a textual parallel linking it with homosexuality, but on a modern psychological projection upon a deliberately vague term. John Shelby Spong, in Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism, writes:

"Is it not possible, even probable, that this was the inner source of his deep self-negativity, his inner turmoil, his self-rejection, his superhuman zeal for a perfection he could never achieve? Could this also be his thorn in the flesh, about which he wrote so plaintively? "When I suggest the possibility that Paul was a homosexual person, I do not mean to be salacious or titillating or even to suggest something that many would consider scandalous. I see no evidence to suggest that Paul ever acted out his sexual desires and passions."

In a later work, Why Christianity Must Change or Die, Spong reformulates the same thesis thus:

"I suggested that perhaps the 'thorn in the flesh' that plagued Paul, that power to which his body said yes even when his mind said no, was that he was himself a deeply repressed, self-rejecting gay man."

And the argument that Romans 1:26–27 gives him away is an inversion of the burden of proof: if condemning what one practises gives one away, and not condemning it also does, the hypothesis is confirmed by anything whatever, which is the elegant way of saying that it is confirmed by nothing.

Fifth, silence and falsifiability. The plea turns the absence of testimony into testimony: Luke is silent, Paul is silent, the enemies are silent, the second-century hagiographer substitutes. A hypothesis that explains equally the presence and the absence of testimony is corroborated by neither: it is irrefutable, and the irrefutable is not the same as the proved. Absence is evidence when the record would be expected, and here it would have been. The Ebionites (Jews who believed in Yeshu and kept the Torah) rejected him, according to Irenaeus, as an 'apostate from the law' (Against Heresies 1.26.2, apostatam legis), and Eusebius repeats the formula in Greek, ἀποστάτην τοῦ νόμου (Ecclesiastical History 3.27.4). Epiphanius, in the Panarion (30.16.6–9), records their version:

Paul, a Greek by birth, became a proselyte and had himself circumcised in order to marry the daughter of the priest and, spurned because they did not give her to him, wrote against circumcision, the Sabbath and the Torah.

But observe what this means as testimony: when the most furious enemies of Paul needed a motive for his apostasy, they sought it in uncontrolled desire for a woman. Abd al-Jabbar, in the tenth century, preserves in his Tathbīt the memory of a Judaeo-Christian source studied by Shlomo Pines: according to it, the followers of Paul 'became Romanised' (تَرَوَّمُوا, tarawwamū), and it was not the Romans who became Christianised; not a whisper of the bedchamber. Julian, the philosopher emperor, called him a charlatan, according to Cyril of Alexandria. Rabbinic literature does not name him clearly. The hypothesis requires that all these witnesses, of opposed interests, agreed to keep silent about the one charge that would have been lethal.

There remains the objection from habit evidence. Luke edits, it is true. But to edit a doctrinal conflict between apostles is not the same as to censor a criminal charge, and to extrapolate from the first kind of omission to the second is an inference of the same genus as the one it seeks to prove. Moreover, the Book of Acts is full of scandals that benefit no one (Ananias and Sapphira, the dispute that separates Paul and Barnabas), and it preserves three doctrinal accusations in all their letters. A censor who keeps the minor charge in view in order to hide the greater would have to count on no ancient reader suspecting the one that is missing, and the Ebionites, who suspected everything, would have used it.

Sixth, the standard of proof. The plea, so Roman, would be inadmissible in the jurisprudence that it invokes. The halakhah does not convict on indications, however convergent: the Bavli, in Sanhedrin 37b, teaches that not even one who was seen pursuing another with a sword and who was found dead is convicted without witnesses to the act; Devarim 19:15 requires two; and the confession of the accused himself does not count, אין אדם משים עצמו רשע, 'no man makes himself wicked' (Bavli, Sanhedrin 9b; Yevamot 25b), so that the 'involuntary confession' of Romans 7 would be, in Jewish law, void even if it were what the lawyer believes. The lawyer, a Noahide, may reply with the laxer standard of the ben Noach, for whom a single judge and a single witness suffice, without warning (Bavli, Sanhedrin 57b; Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:14). But that standard governs the Gentile, and Paul declares himself a Hebrew, of the tribe of Binyamin (Philippians 3:5; Romans 11:1), and a Jew is judged by the standard of Israel. And not even the standard of the ben Noach replaces the witness: it asks for one.

Let it be clear what this audit does not do: it does not acquit. To withdraw a charge impossible to prove does not rehabilitate the accused of those that do stand in his own hand. It returns him to his natural tribunal, which is not that of the bedchamber but that of the Torah, and before that tribunal there is a case file, as we shall see further on.

What the second century did with Iconium

There is a book that can be read as the answer of a Christian of the following generation to the lawyer's question. Luke says that in Iconium there was a plot to stone Paul and does not say why. In the second half of the second century someone set about filling that gap, and filled it precisely in Iconium: the Acts of Paul and Thecla (Πράξεις Παύλου καὶ Θέκλης), a tale that formed part of the Acts of Paul and that reaches us in Greek and in Coptic, Syriac, Armenian, Latin, Ethiopic and Arabic versions. I know of no Aramaic or Hebrew original, and the scholarly record of the work does not register one either: it is Greek literature, from Asia Minor, not a find hidden in some sacred tongue.

Carl Rasmussen, [Fresco of Paul and Thecla in the Cave of St Paul, Ephesus], photograph, Holy Land Photos, identifier TWCSEPPT03, accessed 18 November 2026, https://holylandphotos.org/photos/TWCSEPPT03.

Its author has a known trade and a known punishment. Tertullian relates, around the year 200, that a presbyter of Asia composed that work 'out of love for Paul' (amore Pauli) and that, convicted and confessed, he was removed from office (loco decessisse; On Baptism 17.5). That is: a devotee of Paul, writing to magnify him, and the Church itself sanctioned him. He is the ideal witness for our case, because whoever writes in favour of Paul in Iconium must answer the question of why they wanted to stone him there. Which answer did he choose?

The plot is this. Thecla, betrothed to a certain Thamyris, listens for days to Paul's preaching from a window (θυρίς), without yet having seen his face. The beatitudes that the tale places in the apostle's mouth are a barely disguised echo of 1 Corinthians 7:29, οἱ ἔχοντες γυναῖκας ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες, 'those who have wives as though they had none'. Two travelling companions, Demas and Hermogenes, 'full of hypocrisy', denounce him: Paul, they say, deprives the young of their wives and the maidens of their husbands. Thecla is condemned to the fire; Paul is flogged and expelled from the city (ch. 21).

There are four things that struck me. The first is the one that stopped me: the scandal that the second century attributes to Paul in Iconium is heterosexual and ascetic. He is accused of too little sexuality: of removing women from their marriage beds, not of bringing men into his own. It is the exact reverse of the lawyer's hypothesis, and it is said by a Christian who loved Paul, who knew where the story was set, and who had every incentive to shield him against any rumour. If a suspicion of relations between men had circulated, the tale would have had to answer it; there is not even its shadow.

The second: the names. Demas and Hermogenes are, together with Phygelus, precisely those who 'turn away' in the Pastoral letters (2 Timothy 4:10; 1:15). The author of the Acts of Paul took that catalogue of deserters and turned them into hypocrites of fiction. The desertion of the collaborators, which the lawyer read as an indication of shame, was already for the second century a literary commonplace with a moral explanation: infidelity, not sex.

The third: the face. According to the description that Titus gives to Onesiphorus so that he may recognise Paul (chs 2–3), he is ψιλὸν τῇ κεφαλῇ, ἀγκύλον ταῖς κνήμαις ('bald-headed, bow-legged'), of small stature, with eyebrows meeting and a somewhat prominent nose, 'full of grace: at times he seemed a man, at times he had the face of an angel'. An author who loves his hero imagines him ugly and powerful in word. The erotic charge of the tale (the window, the chains that Thecla kisses, the nocturnal visit to the prison) is Thecla's, and it is auditory: she falls in love with a voice. A good part of modern criticism reads it as restrained eros, not consummated. And the Paul of the tale, when she asks him for baptism, answers with the prudence of a moralist: 'the time is adverse and you are beautiful; lest another temptation befall you worse than the first' (ch. 25). When Alexander tries to force her, he says he does not know her (ch. 26). They are the fears of a man who fears temptation with a woman.

The fourth: what did disturb the Church. Thecla cuts her hair and sews her cloak 'in the masculine manner' to follow him (chs 25 and 40), baptises herself in a pool surrounded by beasts (ch. 34), and Paul sends her off with a sentence that Tertullian never forgave: Ὕπαγε καὶ δίδασκε τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, 'Go and teach the word of God' (ch. 41). What scandalised the second century was not Paul's private life but the idea that a woman might teach and baptise in his name. What was disputed was power, not the bedchamber.

An ingenious lawyer would say that all this is a decoy: that the best cover-ups do not deny the scandal but replace it with another of lesser penalty. It is the hypothesis of the plea in its most elegant version, and the one that least withstands the datum from Tertullian. A presbyter who had invented a novel to shield Paul from a capital suspicion would have been a useful servant of the cause, not a man whom the Church deposes; they deposed him, and they did so because the work authorised women to teach and to baptise. That shows where the front of the controversy ran and where it did not. And a decoy that is proved by the very thing that would refute it is no longer a hypothesis: it is a conviction. If there was a secret, the second century did not keep it, and those with the greatest interest in keeping it wrote something else. With the hypothesis off the table, let us look at the piece I left pending.

What the stones said

The מסית (mesit). Let us look at the category with the lens we did not devote to it before. Devarim 13 contains two packages. In the first (13:2–6) there arises in the midst of Israel a prophet or dreamer who offers a sign and a wonder and proposes to go after other gods; the text rules:

והנביא ההוא או חולם החלום ההוא יומת כי דבר סרה על ה׳, 'that prophet or that dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he has spoken sarah against HaShem'.

Sarah (סָרָה), from the root ס-ו-ר, 'to turn aside from the path', is deviation, rebelliousness. In its same semantic field falls the Greek ἀποστασία, from ἀφίστημι, 'to stand apart', which the Septuagint employs for 'rebellion' (mered, מרד) in Yehoshua 22:22; and it is the word that Acts 21:21 puts in the mouths of Paul's accusers: ἀποστασίαν διδάσκεις ἀπὸ Μωϋσέως, 'you teach apostasy from Moses'. In the second package (13:7–12) a relative or intimate friend whispers the same invitation (כי יסיתך אחיך, 'if your brother entice you'; yesitkha, from ס-ו-ת, 'to seduce, to instigate'), and the penalty is וסקלתו באבנים ומת כי בקש להדיחך מעל ה׳, 'you shall stone him with stones and he shall die, because he sought to thrust you away from HaShem' (13:11); lehadikhakha comes from נ-ד-ח, 'to push, to banish'.

The Mishnah, which is practical, adds what most impressed me when I read it in the original: the mesit is the only defendant for whom a trap is laid. Whereas in any other capital trial prior warning is required, for this one מכמינין לו עדים, 'witnesses are hidden for him' (Sanhedrin 7:10; Bavli, Sanhedrin 67a): he is seated in a room, made to repeat what he said, and behind a partition someone listens. Makhminin comes from כ-מ-ן, 'to lie in hiding'. The Torah concluded that one who seduces his neighbour in private to abandon the faith would not offer voluntary witnesses. The stoners of Lystra had no court, but they had the category: they knew that before a mesit the halakhah suspends procedural courtesies. Whether they proceeded rightly or wrongly according to the halakhah is another question (almost certainly wrongly); what matters is where the idea came to them from.

And there is a piece that the Talmud itself offers. Bavli, Sanhedrin 43a, in the Munich 95 manuscript (the later printed editions omit or distort the identification), says of Yeshu ha-Notzri: כישף והסית והדיח את ישראל, 'he practised sorcery, enticed and led Israel astray'. The three verbs (kishef, hesit, hidiakh) are those of Devarim 13 and of the Mishnah. If the founder was catalogued as mesit umadiah, on what shelf was one to place the man who, in the founder's name, announced to Jews of the diaspora that the Torah had been retired? Note how Tertullus, the prosecuting advocate, sums him up in Acts 24:5: λοιμός, 'plague', and πρωτοστάτης τῆς τῶν Ναζωραίων αἱρέσεως, 'ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes'.

A methodological warning that I cannot omit: everything that precedes about the stones rests on the testimony of the Book of Acts and, for the one stoning that is attested, on Paul's own word (2 Corinthians 11:25). Josephus does not mention Paul anywhere, and the Talmud does not name him directly either; whoever looks for 'Sha'ul of Tarsus' in the Bavli or the Yerushalmi will return empty-handed. The only serious attempt to trace an indirect footprint is that of Harris Hirschberg, which Shlomo Pines collects and extends, and it should be presented with its own cautions. They start from the mishnah on the lishkat Parvah (לשכת פרוה), the 'chamber of Parvah' (Yoma 3:6, according to the numbering that the study follows), and from Bavli, Yoma 35a, where Rav Yosef explains that Parvah was an amgusha (אמגושא), a Persian magus whose name became attached to the chamber through an incident: a tunnel dug to spy on the service of the High Priest on Yom Kippur. Since Parvah lacks a Semitic root, and since parvus and paulus are Latin synonyms for 'small', they suggest that later generations confused a Latin word with a proper name and associated it with Paul, perhaps because the legend preserved the memory of his arrest in the Temple (Acts 21:27) and of the Ebionite tale of the spurned proselyte. From there they pass to a more ambitious thesis: that minim, in certain passages (Bavli, Hullin 13a–b; Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 10:1, with the 'books of Ben La'ana'), would designate the followers of Paul and not only Jewish Christians. The equation Paul = Parvah depends on a Latin phonetic game that no rabbinic text confirms; the term min has a much wider semantic field; and the identification of Paul with 'the Magus' comes from the pseudo-Clementine literature, not from the Talmud. Its value for this article is another: it shows that those who have looked for Paul in the rabbinic sources have had to look for him by ellipsis. That reinforces, and does not weaken, the argument: the case file of the persecution, in the strict sense, is reduced to what Acts and the letters record; the rest is inference about categories (mesit, min, meshumad), and must be presented as such.

The letter that costs Paul's defenders most is the one that he himself signed. 'I died to the law', he writes in Galatians 2:19 (νόμῳ ἀπέθανον); 'if you are circumcised, Yeshu will be of no benefit to you' (5:2); and in 1 Corinthians 9:20–21 he describes his method: with the Jews, 'as a Jew'; with those under the Torah, 'as under the Torah, not being myself under the Torah' (μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον); with those without Torah, 'as without Torah'. That confession of a halakhic chameleon is what the accusers of Acts 21 grasped before any modern commentator: a man whose respect for the law was a function of his audience.

And now the scene that, for me, resolves the enigma. Acts 21:20–26. Ya'akov bar Pandira and the elders say to Paul: you see, brother, how many myriads there are among the Jews who have believed, and all are ζηλωταὶ τοῦ νόμου, 'zealots for the Torah' (the kana'im of Pinchas (Bamidbar 25:11, בקנאו את קנאתי)). They have been informed that you teach the Jews of the diaspora to forsake Moses, not to circumcise their children nor to walk according to the customs. Note who speaks: not the 'unbelieving Jews' but the leadership of the movement of Yeshu itself, and Luke, whom no one will accuse of hostility towards Paul, is the one who records the accusation. And note the solution proposed: that Paul pay the expenses of four men under a Nazirite vow (Bamidbar 6:13–20) and purify himself with them in the Temple, so that all may know that 'you walk keeping the Torah'. When a rumour is cured by a public act of observance, the rumour was halakhic. No one proposes a public ceremony of chastity.

A week later, 21:27–28, the Jews of Asia seize him with the cry: 'This is the man who teaches everyone everywhere against the people, the Torah and this place!' (κατὰ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ τόπου τούτου). It is the triple charge that had already been used against Stephen (6:13) and that echoes Yirmeyahu 26:11, when priests and prophets demand משפט מות לאיש הזה, 'a sentence of death for this man', for having prophesied against the Temple.

There remain the five times that Paul says he received from the Jews 'forty less one' (2 Corinthians 11:24, τεσσαράκοντα παρὰ μίαν), the technical formula of Mishnah Makkot 3:10, ארבעים חסר אחת.

What no case file had looked at

On closing the books there remained on the table several pieces that figured in none of the case files, neither the lawyer's nor those that circulate on this matter, and which seem to me more revealing than the hypothesis that provoked them.

The first is in a single letter. In 2 Corinthians 3:7 Paul calls the written Torah 'the ministry of death, engraved in letters on stones' (ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου ἐν γράμμασιν ἐντετυπωμένη λίθοις), an unmistakable allusion to the luchot ha-even (לוחות האבן), the tablets of stone of Shemot 31:18. Eight chapters later, in the same letter, he declares: 'once I was stoned' (11:25, ἐλιθάσθην). I do not maintain that the parallel is intentional; I maintain that a Jewish reader at Corinth could not fail to hear it. The man who calls the stones of Sinai a 'ministry of death' receives death, almost, in stones.

The second is a verb. In Romans 1:23 Paul says that the Gentiles 'exchanged' (ἤλλαξαν) the glory of the incorruptible God for an image. It is almost word for word Tehillim 106:20, וימירו את כבודם בתבנית שור, 'they exchanged their glory for the likeness of an ox', and Yirmeyahu 2:11, ועמי המיר כבודו, 'my people have exchanged their glory'. The Hebrew verb is hemir (המיר), from מ-ו-ר, 'to substitute', which the Septuagint renders with ἀλλάσσω. Paul repeats it twice more in the same passage, with μετήλλαξαν (1:25, 1:26): 'they exchanged the truth of God for the lie', 'they exchanged natural use for that which is against nature'. Now: mumar is literally 'the one who has exchanged', the participle of the same hemir. That is, in the passage where he condemns, with the lexicon of barter, the exchange of glory for image and of natural use for unnatural use, Paul uses the root of the term that Judaism reserved for one who changes faith. The lawyer wanted to see in the letters a private life; what I see is a vocabulary with which his accusers could describe him.

The third is a curse that turns into exegesis. In Galatians 5:12 Paul wishes that those who trouble the Galatians with circumcision ἀποκόψονται, 'would cut themselves off' (the usual reading is 'would castrate themselves'). The Septuagint of Devarim 23:2 uses the participle of that same verb, ἀποκεκομμένος, for the כרות שפכה, the emasculated man who 'shall not enter the ekklesia of the Lord' (לא יבא פצוע דכא וכרות שפכה בקהל ה׳). The curse is not only an outburst against the cults of Cybele; it is a juridical sentence: that they be left outside the ekklesia (the word with which the Septuagint translates kahal (קהל) and with which Paul names his own communities), excluded from the kahal that he himself founds. And in the same book, 1:8–9, he pronounces on whoever preaches another gospel an ἀνάθεμα ἔστω, the term that the Septuagint uses for the herem (חרם) of Devarim 13:16–18, that which falls upon the city led astray. Two tribunals, a single code: Devarim 13 serves those who stone him and him in order to anathematise his rivals.

The fourth is a frontier that the lawyer, a Noahide, would have recognised at once. The apostolic decree of Acts 15:20 and 29 (to abstain from what is sacrificed to idols, from blood, from what is strangled and from πορνεία) reproduces the mould of what Vayikra 17–18 demands of the ger (הגר), the resident alien: meat sacrificed to idols (17:8–9), blood (17:10–12), carrion and torn flesh (17:13–15), forbidden unions (18:6–26). Vayikra 17–18 is a kind of Noahism avant la lettre, and Sanhedrin 56a–b, which enumerates the seven commandments of the children of Noah, confirms it by the converse route. Two consequences. One: according to Acts 16:4 it is precisely Paul who carries that decree through Lystra, Iconium and Antioch; and the πορνεία of the decree includes the union with a male (Vayikra 18:22, ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה). The man who, according to the lawyer, lived the secret, distributed through the cities of his supposed shame a paper that forbade it. The other, more serious: in his letters Paul never cites the decree (in Galatians 2:6 he says that the 'notables' added nothing to him (οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο)), and in 1 Corinthians 8–10 he treats meat offered to idols as if the decree did not exist: 'an idol is nothing in the world' (8:4), one may eat what is sold in the market without asking (10:25), although he himself draws his limit in 10:14–22, 'flee from idolatry'. For a Noahide jurisprudence, that smells of the frontier of avodah zarah. If the lawyer had looked at Paul from his own law, the case file he would have found was not that of the bedchamber but that of the table.

The fifth is a stone that is not thrown. When the Jews of Asia seize Paul in the Temple, they cry that he has brought Greeks into the sacred precinct and has profaned the place, because they had seen with him the Ephesian Trophimus (Acts 21:28–29, Τρόφιμος ὁ Ἐφέσιος). That accusation is not rhetoric: in the Temple there was a stone balustrade, the soreg (סורג; Mishnah Middot 2:3), with inscriptions in Greek and Latin that forbade passage to non-Jews on pain of death, and Josephus describes them three times (War 5.193–194 and 6.124–126; Antiquities 15.417). One of them was found in 1871, discovered by Charles Clermont-Ganneau, and is today in Istanbul: ὃς δ’ ἂν ληφθῇ, ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος ἔσται διὰ τὸ ἐξακολουθεῖν θάνατον, 'whoever is caught will be responsible to himself for the death that follows'. It is the only scene in the whole list in which the lynchers had a prior text, engraved in stone, that gave them the juridical reason. The other attempts are passions; this one is protocol.

And the sixth is a correction to the very account I had been constructing. Acts 28:21–22 records what the Jews of Rome say to Paul on his arrival: they have received no letters from Judaea about him, no brother has come to speak evil of him, and of that αἵρεσις they know only that 'everywhere it is spoken against'. That is, there was no universal order, no circular of excommunication travelling from synagogue to synagogue. What there was was a chain of memories: those who attack in Lystra come from Antioch and Iconium; those who attack in Berea come from Thessalonica; those who attack in the Temple come from Asia. The rejection is real, constant and local; each time it is organised by those who had already heard the sermon. That is an important difference between an apostate declared by a court and a mesit pursued by those who listened to him.

I close. To the Noahide lawyer I owe a well-formulated question: his hypothesis, which is false, obliged me to put in order, verb by verb, the times that someone raised a stone against Paul, and to discover that none has a sexual motive, that almost all have a doctrinal motive, and that Paul himself, with his signature, supplied most of the proofs. It obliged me also to separate datum from inference: the only verifiable thing about his relation to women is a doctrine (with its manuscripts, its verbs and its reading of Genesis), not a conduct; and a doctrine is not answered with a secret of the bedchamber, it is argued with texts.

I am left with a question that is not for him. If each stone has in view a doctrinal motive, documented by Luke, by Paul, by Irenaeus and by Josephus, that is, by those who had no reason to agree, what is needed in order to prefer an indemonstrable secret to a demonstrated disagreement? And what does one save who needs the scandal to be one of the bedchamber and not of Torah?